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REGULATING COMPENSATION
CHRISTINE HURT*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2008, the United States economy experienced what has
been called a financial crisis, and what this article labels a "contracts
crisis." The exact nature of this crisis, its causes and its effects will be
analyzed and discussed for decades to come.1 Industries, agencies, firms
and individuals as diverse as mortgage brokers, investment banks, ratings
agencies, derivatives traders, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and homeowners have been blamed.2 Though scrutiny has
focused on the rise and fall of the real estate market, few participants in the
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thank participants at the Ohio State University Entrepreneurial Business Law
Journal's 2010 Symposium: The Relationship between American Government and
American Business, and at faculty workshops at Arizona State University School of
Law and Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.
1 In May 2009, Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
("FCIC") to investigate and study the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 1617
(2009) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729) (stating the function of the Commission
as, inter alia, "to examine the causes of the current financial and economic crisis"
by examining more than twenty enumerated aspects of the U.S. regulatory system).
The FCIC was required to issue a written report by December 15, 2010. See id
§ 5(h); see also Sewell Chan and Eric Dash, Staff Losses and Dissent May Hurt
Crisis Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at B I (noting that the FCIC, though it has
endured a slow start and significant turnover, "held 12 days of hearings,
interviewed more than 500 witnesses and pored over hundreds of thousands of
pages of documents"). On January 27, 2011, the FCIC issued its final report. See
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011).
2 Among the twenty-two areas that the FCIC was charged with examining were
areas as diverse as mark-to-market accounting methods and credit ratings agencies
and areas as broad as "financial institutions and government-sponsored
enterprises." See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act § 5(c).
3 The FCIC's final report concludes that the crisis was triggered by the collapse of
the housing bubble and that "the losses were magnified by derivatives such as
synthetic securities." See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at
xvi.
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economy have escaped criticism for contributions to the financial crisis.
Commentators have blamed those who incurred losses, from homeowners
to financial institutions, 4 as contributing to systemic risk;5 those who
protected themselves from loss, however, have been branded as profiteers
and speculators and blamed even more harshly.6
The one common criticism focused on the contracts.7 Though these
various firms and individuals legally contracted to accept risks, these risks,
at least in hindsight, were unacceptable risks,8 and these contracts became
4 See id at xix ("In the years leading up to the crisis, too many financial
institutions, as well as too many households, borrowed to the hilt, leaving them
vulnerable to financial distress or ruin if the value of their investments declined
even modestly.").
5 Most speakers use the term "systemic risk" to refer to any number of situations in
which a triggering event has an impact on a broader group of participants. See
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). Professor Schwarcz
defines "systemic risk" as it applies to institutions as occurring when:
[A] trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional
failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences -
sometimes referred to as a domino effect. These consequences
could include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market
failures. Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a
chain of) significant losses to financial institutions or substantial
financial-market price volatility. In either case, the consequences
impact financial institutions, markets or both.
See id. at 198. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model, systematic risk as applied to
markets refers to "risks that are general to all securities, that are associated with the
performance of the economy generally, and, in the case of stocks, with the
performance of the stock market." Importantly, shareholders cannot eliminate
systematic risk through diversification and firms vary in sensitivity to systematic
risk. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
119 (2d ed. 2010). The financial crisis may have been caused by the intersection of
market systematic risk and institution systemic risk. See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at
202 (arguing that regulation should focus only on institutions that create systemic
risk that endangers market systemic risk).
6 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010)
(quoting Steve Eisman, who ran a fund that purchased derivatives that increased in
value as subprime mortgages declined as saying "[b]eing short in 2007 and making
money from it was fun, because we were short badguys. In 2008 it was the entire
financial system that was at risk. We were still short ... It's sort of like the flood's
about to happen and you're Noah.").
7 Professor David Skeel writes that the Dodd-Frank Act aims to reform "both the
instruments and institutions of the new financial world," focusing on one type of
instrument: derivatives. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES
(2011).
8 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at xix ("[Major
financial firms] took on enormous exposures in acquiring and supporting subprime
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toxic. That the contracting parties entered into these agreements
nevertheless can be ascribed to various failures: individual decision-making
failures,9 captive gatekeepers,'I skewed incentives,11 complexity or just
plain greed.' 2 Therefore, commentators targeted these areas of weakness
and analyzed whether existing regulation of these areas, if any, was
sufficiently lax to require that it be revisited. Theoretically, if regulation
could mandate that contracting parties volunteer more information, retain
certain amounts of risk or forbear from entering into certain kinds of
contracts, then nationwide economic disaster could be avoided in the future.
Viewed in this way, the financial crisis can be framed as a "contracts
crisis." Just as perceived torts crises, which create unpalatable torts
obligations for repeat players, spawned legislative efforts at tort law reform,
the perceived contracts crisis has in turn inspired legislators to try to reform
existing and future contracts and the law that governs them.
Regulatory scrutiny focused on both the internal workings of financial
institutions and on the external contractual relationships between these
institutions and other firms. Even as the causes of the economic meltdown
were still being investigated, legislation was being proposed and even
approved.13 During this post-crisis period, almost any financial contract
was deemed worthy of regulatory interest: mortgage loan documents,
mortgage broker contracts, bond indentures relating to the sale of mortgage-
lenders and creating, packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions of dollars in
mortgage-related securities, including synthetic financial products. Like Icarus,
they never feared flying ever closer to the sun.").
9 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 39-41 (2008) (concluding that mortgage loan consumers make costly mistakes
and accept terms more expensive than they could qualify for elsewhere).
'
0 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at xviii ("Too often,
[the regulators] lacked the political will-in a political and ideological environment
that constrained it-as well as the fortitude to critically challenge the institutions
and the entire system they were entrusted to oversee.").
11 See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 130 (2010)
(describing the compensation plans of mortgage brokers at Ameriquest that
incentivized the brokers to focus on mortgage volume, not quality).
12 See id at 83 (laying blame on both gambling homeowners and pushy lenders:
"The line between predatory lending and get-rich-quick speculating-or a
desperate desire for cash--was often difficult to discern.").
13 The most significant piece of legislation to emerge from the 2008 crisis was the
Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 123 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010). See Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of
Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3 (quoting President Obama as
referring to the 2008 financial crisis when saying "because of this law, the
American people will never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street's
mistakes.").
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backed securities, and credit default swaps and other derivatives. Though
most proposed regulation would apply only to future contracts, some
notable efforts were made to rewrite existing contracts, particularly in the
residential mortgage industry.
This energized regulatory spirit in the financial sector, after decades of
a more laissez-faire approach to capital markets, intersected with a pre-
existing but largely stalled movement to regulate executive compensation.
1 4
For years, commentators had argued that shareholders suffered when
executives were awarded excessive pay packages that were not tied to
whether the executives were maximizing shareholder wealth. 5 Suddenly,
the "pay with performance" movement had a new narrative that resonated
with lawmakers and regulators: flaws in compensation schemes created
incentives for individuals in firms to take on excessive risk,16 and in the
aggregate, this creates systemic risk that threatens the U.S. economy. Once
proponents of executive compensation reform were able to link pay without
performance concerns to systemic risk concerns, then regulation was almost
inevitable. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act ("Dodd-Frank") was passed in July 2010 and addresses many aspects
of the financial industry, including executive compensation.' 7
The reform that has emerged, however, is simple executive
compensation regulation wrapped up in financial crisis clothing. Neither
theory nor data suggest that the compensation of a handful of individual
officers at large firms, even financial firms, generated levels of firm-level
risk that then contributed to the 2008 financial crisis or exacerbates
systemic risk going forward.18 Moreover, the reforms that are now law bear
14 See infra Pt.V.A.
15 See Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric? " and Other Tales From the
World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2907, 2908
(2008) ("Compensation received by executives increasingly draws the attention not
only of corporate governance specialists, but of the media, shareholders, and
fovemment officials.").
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance,
158 U. PA. L. REv. 1915 (2010) ("Firms, investors, and regulators around the world
are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is
tied to long-term results, in part to avoid incentives for excessive risk taking.").
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
18 The FCIC Report lists a number of causes of the financial crisis including
particular institutions that contributed to the crisis and the short-term compensation
incentives of brokers, traders, mortgage originators, and executives at each of the
institutions that contributed. See FiNANcIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 64 ("Many major financial institutions created asymmetric compensation
packages that paid employees enormous sums for short-term success, even if these
same decisions resulted in significant long-term losses or failure for investors and
taxpayers."). Perhaps seen collectively, the compensation of tens of thousands of
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little theoretical connection to the types of incentive compensation plans
that do lead to firm-level risk. Yet, this old solution to the old,problem of
management agency costs is now a proposed new solution to the new
problem of systemic risk, arguably an amalgamation of management
agency costs.
Interestingly, efforts to reform residential mortgages ex-post met with
substantial public resistance, but executive compensation reform has not.
However, both types of reform interfere with private parties' liberty to
contract. Though some criticized proposals to rewrite residential loan
agreements as illegitimate from a contract law point of view, the prevailing
criticism focused on the undeserving nature of the borrowers who would
benefit from any contractual modifications. Interfering with contracts when
the interference penalizes undeserving parties, such as wealthy executives,
fares better in the courts of public opinion.
However, the solution of regulating executive compensation may not
only prove ineffective in alleviating systemic risk, but it may also open the
door to public intermeddling with other private contracts, even in hindsight,
particularly when the losing contract party is unsympathetic. The narrative
of the evils of executive compensation works with the post-crisis populace
because its targets are white-collar, wealthy and ostensibly responsible for
the excesses that wrought the crisis. However, the new targets of
compensation regulation may be blue-collar, middle-class and largely
outside any of the institutions that participated in activities associated with
the financial meltdown. For example, the next targets of the "undeserved"
compensation debates may well be the unionized private employees and the
public employees, both unionized and nonunionized.' 9 Overcoming any
qualms that exist to interfering with negotiated contracts in the first instance
may lead to an appetite to do so in the second instance.
employees may have worked to create excessive firm-level risk that then combined
to create systemic risk. But see id. at 444-45 (dissenting commission member
focusing on the explosion of nontraditional mortgages and saying that the various
disparate causes listed by the majority, including compensation, could not have
caused the financial crisis either alone or in the aggregate).
19 See Ron Lieber, Battle Looms Over Huge Costs of Public Pensions, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2010, at B1 (describing a coming "class war" between the "haves," public
employees with generous pensions and the "have-nots," the taxpayers who have
declining 401 (k) retirement accounts); Eileen Norcross & Todd Zywicki, How
Public Worker Pensions Are Too Rich for New York's-andAmerica 's-Blood,
N.Y. DAILY NEws, Aug. 8, 2010,
http://www.nydailynews.con/opinions/2010/08/08/2010-08-
08_howpublic worker pensionsare.html (describing the hazards of restricting
benefits to current government workers, whose original contracts promised them
pension benefits that state governments cannot afford).
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II. FINANCIAL CRISIS AS CONTRACT CRISIS
The analogy between the contract crisis and the tort crisis is not perfect.
Critics argue that the tort crisis is an ongoing, chronic problem, which
began with the growth of products liability in the 1970s,2 ° thus converting a
large segment of torts lawsuits from negligence suits to "strict liability"
suits." In addition, the tort law that preexists regulation is not the product
of individual choice in the way that private contracts are. "Unreformed"
tort law is judge-made law that governs the obligations and liabilities of
strangers to one another. 22 Therefore, tort reformers do not have to
overcome obstacles to interfering with the choices of private citizens; they
are merely reigning in activist judges and runaway juries. 23
However, though the contract crisis is being treated as an acute
condition, its roots can and have been traced to the creation of the Federal
National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") and the securitization of residential
mortgages.24 If products liability is the evil villain in the torts crisis, then
securitization most certainly is the villain in the contract crisis. 25 And
20 See Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict Products Liability
Unbound, in TORTS STORiEs 229, 240-41 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003) (noting that following the first strict liability products case in
1963, forty-one states had adopted the rule of products liability by 1976, riding a
wave of consumers' rights sentiment).
21 See, e.g., ERiC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY:
AMERICAN TORT LAW ON TRIAL 9 (2006) (arguing that with the creation of product
liability, "[b]y the 1970s, all the legal elements were in place to expand the number
of injuries that would end up in the tort system.").
22 One area of tort law that is frequently cited in calls for tort reform is medical
malpractice, which very often features plaintiffs and defendants that are not
strangers but that have a pre-existing physician-patient relationship. Unlike
products liability, however, medical malpractice law is not a recent creation.
3 See HELLAND & TABARROK, supra note 21, at 129 ("Limiting the power of
judges and juries by statute has been the preferred method of tort reform since the
mid-1970s."). In fact, Helland and Tabarrok argue that allowing plaintiffs and
defendants to contract ex-ante for tort relief is the optimal reform. See id. at 132
(giving as an example of how contract can substitute for tort law a patient and
physician contracting as to limitations of liability prior to a particular medical
?rocedure).
4 See MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 11, at 4 ("The seeds of financial disaster
were sown more than thirty years ago when three smart, ambitious men, working
sometimes in concert--allies in a cause they all believed in--and sometimes in
opposition--competitors trying to gain advantage over each other-created a shiny
new financial vehicle called the mortgage-backed security.").
25 See id. at 237 (quoting Lewis Ranieri, the inventor of the mortgage-backed
security, as saying "I wasn't out to invent the biggest floating craps game of all
time, but that's what happened.").
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though the contracts at issue are bargained for by private parties, critics
argue" that the third party in these contracts is the U.S. government, which
subsidizes residential mortgages in myriad ways, including through
goveinment guarantees of conventional home loans, the home mortgage
interest deduction and lax regulation. Thus, when regulators enter the fray
of residential home mortgages, the status quo is not one of private contract.
Tort reform is often accompanied by consequentialist arguments:
reform is necessary in order to avoid business firms exiting an industry,
doctors exiting a jurisdiction, huge costs being passed on to consumers, and
bankruptcies of firms if not entire industries. Recent financial reform has
made the same arguments. Reform was necessary to avoid bankruptcies of
financial firms and to save the health of the financial industry. Just as in
product liability and medical malpractice, repeat defendants in the financial
crisis would also feel financial pain. And finally, the availability of
insurance (or credit default swaps ("CDS") and other hedging techniques)
skewed incentives.
The skeleton beneath the financial crisis was a chain of documents that
may have once seemed unconnected, but in hindsight were largely
dependent on one another. At one end of the chain were mortgages and
deeds of trust signed by homeowner borrowers and financial institution
lenders. These documents were then assigned to special purpose vehicles
("SPVs") via other documents, and securities issued by those SPVs were
sold via trust indentures. Accompanying these basic contracts were piles of
other documents: notes, warranties, side letters, etc. The purchasers of
these securities also entered into credit default swaps. Unrelated investors
also purchased derivatives based on these mortgage-backed securities and
these credit default swaps. However, once the real estate market began to
decline and the economy began to worsen, defaults on one part of the
skeleton were going to have severe impacts on other parts. Once
homeowners defaulted, then issuers of mortgage backed securities ("MBS")
would default, then credit default swap sellers with too much exposure
would default, and so on.
Though much of U.S. contract law rests on a fundamental premise of
freedom of contract,26 few in the U.S. were willing to let these contracts
play out according to their terms and conditions of default. Defaulting
homeowners would inevitably lead to foreclosures of the underlying
residences, resulting in neighborhoods with vacant homes, glutting the
resale market and lowering real estate prices. On the human side,
foreclosures lead to evictions of individuals and families, disrupting
26 See Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REv. 1079,
1094 (2010) ("As a nation, we value freedom of contract and our laws have long
enforced contracts that contain terms that arguably are unfair to one of the
contracting parties.").
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employment and education, causing domestic tragedy, and burdening. social
welfare systems. Defaulting MBS issuers would leave investors with huge
losses, most probably not covered by the CDS insurance they purchased
once the CDS issuers became insolvent and declared bankruptcy. In
addition, many CDS issuers and purchasers were financial institutions that
played instrumental roles in the U.S. economy and whose demise .would
cause jobs to disappear and threaten the U.S. banking system. To prevent
all the dominos from falling at the same time, regulators stepped in to create
new scenarios other than the ones anticipated by the skeleton of contracts.
Some of these reforms focused on the front end of the domino chain:
the mortgages. Others focused on the end of the chain: the financial
institutions. Additionally, some regulation focused on future reforms:
mandating certain provisions in future contracts, prohibiting certain future
contracts, limiting consideration in future contracts. However, some
reforms focused on rewriting existing contracts. Another popular device to
encourage contract parties to deviate from current contracts was to
demonize those pressing contractual rights and pressuring them to
27
renegotiate.
III. RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
A residential mortgage is at its foundation an agreement between the
borrower and the lender that the lender shall lend a stated amount of money
to the borrower in exchange for two things: a promise to repay under stated
terms and conditions and a security interest in the residence being
purchased with the loan proceeds. Under the terms of the agreement, the
borrower makes scheduled payments of principal and interest. In the event
that the borrower fails to make a scheduled payment and fails to cure such
breach of the agreement, the lender/mortgagee has the option of terminating
the agreement and taking possession of the underlying collateral. In this
way, the mortgage acts as a type of liquidated damages provision-the
parties have agreed beforehand that in the event of default, the mortgagee
will have the right to the collateral. Because states recognize that the
seizure of one's home is more disruptive than the repossession of one's car
or other personal property, states have implemented various types of
foreclosure procedures that must be followed. At the end of the day,
27 Days before Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, President
Obama attempted to convince secured creditors to renegotiate their debt in an
attempt to allow Chrysler to avoid insolvency. Two senior creditors refused,
preferring to rely on their priority claims in bankruptcy, a priority that they had
bargained for when originating the debt. President Obama called them out as
"speculators" and remarked, "I don't stand with those who held out when everyone
else is making sacrifices." See Zachary Krouwe, The Lenders Obama Decided to
Blame for Chrysler's Fall, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at BI.
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however, the mortgage agreement reflects the fact that both the borrower
and the mortgagee are taking the risk that the collateral will decline in
value. In fact, the mortgagee assumes this risk to a greater extent, given
that the borrower has the right to "put" the residence to the mortgagee in the
event that the value of the residence falls below the amount the borrower
owes to the lender. However, in most economic climates, borrowers have
very little incentive to strategically default on their mortgages and ruin their
credit history; should housing prices fall dramatically, however, this
incentive increases.
Ironically, to let these contracts terminate according to their terms and
conditions may harm both the borrower and the mortgagee. On the one
hand, mortgagees can be left with devalued property after a borrower
defaults instead of a steady income stream of interest payments. On the
other hand, a borrower who wishes to stay in the residence may be evicted
from the home, losing not only equity (if any) but incurring the economic
and emotional costs of relocating.
A. Strategic Defaults
If the borrower defaults either out of necessity or strategic choice, the
mortgagee could be left with a residence whose value is lower than the
amount the mortgagee had disbursed to the borrower and have to incur
costs to resell that property. If a mortgagee could prevent a borrower who
was able to make payments from defaulting, if the mortgagee could take
away that contract right, then this would be valuable to the mortgagee.
To stem the tide of strategic defaults, government actors did not
introduce regulation, but instead attempted to use moral suasion and
shaming to limit the amount of strategic defaults,28 even if defaulting would
be the economically rational thing to do. Many commentators have argued
that the mortgage agreement specifically contemplates this situation by
giving the borrower the right to walk away after handing over the keys and
28 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, H9-856, Remarks by Secretary Henry
M. Paulson, Jr. U.S. Housing and Mortgage Market Update (Mar. 3, 2008). In this
press release, Secretary Henry Paulsen explained that underwater borrowers should
remember that they purchased their homes for long-term use. See id. ("And let me
emphasize, any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to
walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator-and one who is
not honoring his obligations."); Press Release, Fannie Mae, New Nationwide
Survey Provides Comprehensive Look at Sentiment Toward Housing (Apr. 6,
2010), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2010/4989.jhtml?p=
Media&s=News+Releases ("The public also strongly believes in the importance of
upholding the financial commitment involved in buying and owning a home, even
during these challenging times when home values have fallen.").
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that exercising this right is not amoral.2 9 However, government agencies
counseling underwater homeowners stressed that continuing to, make
mortgage payments was the responsible thing to do.30 Eventually, quasi-
government actors in the home lending industry increased the extralegal
penalties for strategically defaulting. Fannie Mae, the guarantor of most
residential home loans, announced that strategic defaulters would be
ineligible for subsequent guaranteed loans for seven years and that the firm
would pursue deficiency judgments against them. 3'
A regulatory proposal that would make a borrower less likely to
strategically default was aimed at reducing ex-post the principal amount of
the mortgage, eliminating gap between the loan amount and the fair market
value of the residence. As borrowers become more likely to default when
their "negative equity" increases, eliminating the negative equity would
reduce the number of strategic defaults. However, if avoiding strategic
default would be worth reducing the amount of principal that would be
repaid, then surely lenders would have done this without a regulatory
mandate. Many have argued that the structure of the contracts limited
mortgagees' rights to modify mortgages and the benefits of those
modifications.
First, modem-day mortgages are subject to securitization, which allows
the mortgage originator to transfer the mortgage or the economic rights
under the mortgage to one or more special purpose vehicles, which issue
debt securities secured by those mortgage income streams. The
conventional wisdom holds that because of the distribution of rights under
the mortgages, mortgage servicers may not have the ability to modify
mortgages without consent from numerous and disparate parties.3 Second,
the contracts with the mortgage servicer may dampen the mortgage
29 See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the
Social Management of the Financial Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971, 983-85
(2010) (explaining how some homeowners could save hundreds of thousands of
dollars by walking away from their homes, even if their credit scores suffer in the
short term).
30 See id. at 1003 (describing the advice given by various agencies to distressed
homeowners, which exaggerate the effects of default on borrowers' financial
futures).
31 See Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Increases Penalties for Borrowers
Who Walk Away (June 23, 2010), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/
newsreleases/2010/5071.jhtml ("Walking away from a mortgage is bad for
borrowers and bad for communities and our approach is meant to deter the
disturbing trend toward strategic defaulting.").
32 See generally Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein
Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82
So. CAL. L. REv. 1075 (2009) (labeling mortgage-backed securities as "suicide
pacts" in which all parties have made modification impossible to deter strategic
threats of default).
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servicer's appetite to modify mortgages, particularly lowering the
principal.33 Modifications require more man-hours, which may not be
compensated, and lower principal amounts may mean lower fees.
Because of the failure of these networks of contracts, regulators
proposed intervening and mandating the reduction of principal loan
amounts. As discussed below, these proposals never became law.
However, these proposals, though intrusive, would have also ameliorated
the second negative consequence of letting mortgages terminate according
to their provisions: borrowers losing their homes.
B. Borrower Home Loss
As much as a default may adversely affect a mortgagee, the borrower-
mortgagor has much more to lose; which is why strategic defaults are
usually last resorts made by borrowers with some disposable income. The
borrower who does not have the wherewithal to make mortgage payments
will suffer more from involuntary loss of residence, including expenses
necessary to move and secure alternative housing. For many borrowers, a
home residence is not a mere investment but also has an emotional
attachment component. Even putting noneconomic considerations aside,
involuntary foreclosure is a disruptive and costly influence on a borrower.
However, the terms and conditions of every mortgage allow for the
mortgagee to take the property and remove the borrower and any tenants
from it.
Though foreclosures have been occurring for hundreds of years, the
prospect of a substantial number of foreclosures happening simultaneously
in the U.S., perhaps clustered in particular neighborhoods, counties or
states, is a daunting one. Foreclosed properties have a negative effect not
only on the borrower involved, but also on the property values of
neighboring residences. One could imagine a domino effect in which
reduced property values and escalating mortgage payments cause defaults
and foreclosures, lowering the values of surrounding properties and starting
the cycle again.
Again, the first line of governmental position was nonregulatory in
nature. President Obama and others first tried moral suasion to urge lenders
to enter into loan modification discussions with borrowers to avoid
foreclosure. For various reasons, these loan modifications were rare.
33 See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 565, 624 (2009) ("Foreclosure is
often much more profitable for servicers than modification, so servicers have a
strong financial incentive to foreclose on defaulted mortgages, even if a workout
would be better for the MBS holders.").
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Obama then proceeded to try to give lenders incentives to modify existing
mortgages, by subsidizing and funding the efforts.
The second wave of regulatory response was to propose federal
programs aimed at creating financial incentives for lenders to modify
mortgages either by reducing the principal amount or reducing the interest
rate and corresponding monthly payments. One of the first of such
programs, HOPE for Homeowners, attempted to induce lenders to reduce
the principal amount of underwater mortgages to 85.5% of the newly
appraised value of the home. Lenders would then share in any future
appreciation of the home with the mortgagor. Commentators predicted that
lenders would only accept this bargain if a property's value was
substantially less than the remaining loan principal.
The most comprehensive program, Home Affordable Modification Plan
("HAMP"), was announced in February 2009 (first referred to as the
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Program), and offered mortgage
servicers financial incentives to enroll all mortgages under their control in
the program. In HAMP, homeowners could apply for a modification that
would reduce payments for up to five years. Servicers, if enrolled in
HAMP, would reduce interest rates and have the option to reduce principal
amounts. However, a current Congressional report states that ninety-five
percent of mortgages receiving permanent modifications under the plan
have principal amounts larger than before the modifications (125% of the
residence's value, compared with 120%). 34 In addition, out of 1.9 million
applications, a smaller number than anticipated, only approximately
500,000 loans have been permanently modified. Accordingly, attempting
to alter contract parties' incentives to amend contracts after-the-fact have
not been successful.
Most commentators blame the voluntariness of HAMP as its downfall:
lenders simply do not want to modify the contracts that they drafted and are
willing to stick with the rights in default for which they bargained. Even
the opportunity to avoid an expensive strategic default with a modification
may not be that attractive to a lender who is a repeat player in the loan
modification negotiation process. If negotiating with one strategic
borrower results in a reduction of principal, then theoretically other
underwater borrowers, who otherwise would not have defaulted, may also
threaten default to receive a principal reduction. The lender who might
otherwise have had to foreclose on 100 homes might have to then modify
the principal not on 100 homes, but on 200 homes, or 500, or 1000. The
end result would then be that the lender does not benefit economically by
voluntarily modifying underwater mortgages. Therefore, lenders may not
34 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER REPORT: A REVIEW OF
TREASURY'S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS (Dec. 14, 2010), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/reports/library/report- 121410-cop.cfrn.
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be voluntarily modifying these loans on their own, not because of
contractual restrictions or servicer agency problems, 35 but because they see
no benefit. Moreover, the financial incentives under HAMP do not seem to
be overcoming their reluctance.
Arguably, modifying truly distressed loans in default because of job
loss or other income interruption would not encourage other borrowers to
follow suit and would be more beneficial to lenders than foreclosure of
underwater properties. 36 However, these are the very loans that are the
most difficult to modify. Borrowers who are unable to afford mortgage
payments may have the same difficulty unless the payment is lowered
substantially.37 These modifications are also the most likely to go into re-
default. In fact, 25.4% of HAMP-modified mortgages have gone into re-
default within twelve months.38
Other commentators stressed that lenders were not equipped to handle
the volume of modification requests, many of which had to be underwritten
again as if they were original loans. Servicers could not handle the
workload, so modification efforts were lagging.39  Alternatively, or
aggregately, lenders preferred keeping the full loans on their balance sheets
for as long as possible for accounting purposes, whereas modified loans
would weaken their balance sheets.4 °
35 See The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis. Is it Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy
Reform?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Mark A. Calabria,
Dir., Fin. Reg. Stud.), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfn?id=3993
&wit id=8150 [hereinafter Calabria Testimony].
36 However, lenders were turning down modification requests from borrowers most
likely to be dependable refinancers, those who had substantial equity in their homes
but had an unexpected hardship, because lenders were happy to just sell the home
for the amount of the "overwater" mortgage. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 405.
37 An alternate theory suggests that many defaulting borrowers were obligated
under exotic mortgages with low initial payments that "reset" to higher payments
and would be able to benefit long-term from a mortgage modification. However,
commentators suggest that these types of mortgages went into default at the same
rate as conventional mortgages and that the existence of little or no equity given the
nature of those mortgages also signal probable failure after a modification. See
Calabria Testimony, supra note 35, at 3.3 8 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 34, at 89.
39 See Joe Nocera, From Treasury to Banks, an Ultimatum on Mortgage Relief,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at B I (suggesting that mortgage servicers were never
structured to be large-scale "full-blown underwriting shops").
40 See id. (reporting that banks prefer to "extend and pretend," keeping defaulted
properties on their books at full value rather than take losses on their balance
sheets, which might affect public opinion as to their overall health).
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C. Cramdown Proposals
Given the debate that the weak incentives of HAMP could not
overcome mortgage servicer backload and lenders' desires to maintain their
high valuations, a more intrusive regulatory proposal was introduced in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 4' This proposal would
allow judges in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings to modify residential
mortgages unilaterally. From a freedom of contract point of view, this
mandatory rewriting by a third party is substantially harder to accept than
even government shaming or government incentives to rewrite valid
contracts. Accordingly, this proposal has been referred to as "cramdown. 'A2
It would result in reductions of principal, thereby removing negative equity
and the incentive to strategically default. In addition, the modification
could lower monthly payments, helping both distressed borrowers and non-
distressed strategic borrowers. Lenders would be saved the transaction
costs of foreclosure and perhaps achieve a desired result that is hampered
by contractual restrictions in securitization structure, administrative cost
and servicer incentives.43 Additionally, the bankruptcy regime allows for
myriad instances of "rewriting" contracts, 44 so taking a firm contractual
liberty stance would ignore the realities of Chapter 13. Opponents,
however, argued that creating the possibility that contracts could be
rewritten in the future would lead lenders to charge higher fees and interest
rates to all borrowers.45
Ultimately, this proposal never gained full traction. Some
commentators suggested that the threat of heavy-handed government
41 See Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat.
1660.
42 See Calabria Testimony, supra note 35, at 4 ("One 'solution' that has been
regularly presented is to allow bankruptcy judges to reduce the principal balance of
a mortgage loan to reflect the reduced value of the home, the so-called
'cramdown."').
43 See Levitin, supra note 33, at 647-48 (arguing that bankruptcy modification are
the optimal solution to the foreclosure crisis and would not increase the costs of
borrowing for homeowners in the future).
44 Most similarly, mortgages of secondary residences and investment properties
may be modified in Chapter 13.
45 See Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of Congressional Proposals to Permit
Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 635,
641 (2010) ("The proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code would
substantially alter the risk characteristics of home mortgages, with likely
substantial effects on future mortgage interest rates and future mortgage
availability."). But see Adam J. Levitin, Back to the Future with Chapter 13: A
Response to Professor Scarberry, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 1261 (2010) (reiterating his
argument that modifications of residential mortgages in bankruptcy would not
increase the costs of borrowing given this current possibility for other types of
mortgages and no corresponding effect).
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intervention may have been a useful tool to persuade lenders to overcome
obstacles to mortgage modification,46 though there is little evidence that
modifications were affected while the proposals were under consideration.
Though some made the argument that this interference with contract for the
benefit of one party was illegitimate,47 the proposals probably floundered
for other reasons. Most notably, critics warned of encouraging moral
hazard among future borrowers and speculators and of handing windfalls 48
to irrational borrowers. Worth noting is that public appetite for ex-post
contract reform seems to vary according to the sympathetic (or
unsympathetic) nature of the contract parties.
IV. COMPENSATION IN THE CRISIS
Although the financial crisis extended into virtually every sector of the
U.S. economy, affecting actors across industries and geographical regions,
blame for the crisis focused on one city street: Wall Street. Specifically,
those employees in the financial sector, whether housed in New York,
Connecticut or elsewhere, who created casino-like markets to trade fictional
or marginal interests in untouched, underlying assets.49 Suddenly, attention
turned on the growing "financialization" of the U.S. economy and on
"speculators" who drive up prices for users and consumers of housing,
credit and food.5°
Accordingly, commentators became very interested in examining not
only how financial actors were compensated prior to the financial crisis, but
also how they continued to be compensated after the crisis. Highly-paid
investment bankers, private equity managers and other financial wizards
seemed especially worthy of blame given how much they were paid to
engage in the risky deals that may have sent the U.S. economy into a death
46 See Gelpem & Levitin, supra note 32, at 1152 ("Moreover, the very threat of
government intervention to rewrite contracts that the parties claim are too rigid to
modify may act as an incentive to find private routes to modification.").
47 See Calabria, supra note 35, at 6 ("We should reject any proposed "solutions"
that are based upon applying coercion to parties in what is essentially a private
contract.").
48 For additional commentary on the rhetorical power of the term "windfall," see
Christine Hurt, The Windfall Myth, 8 GEO. J. L. &PUB. POL'Y 339 (2010).
49 The FCIC Report's majority report mentions "compensation" seventy-nine times
in 410 pages. One section is entitled "The Wages of Finance" and focuses on
compensation. In addition, the report highlights the annual compensation of no
fewer than twenty-three individuals, obviously for effect. See generally FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1.
50 Two recent books explore the arguably negative impact of the "financialization"
of the U.S. economy. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD (2008); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE
SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2008).
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spiral. Blaming reckless homeowners had some appeal, but they seemed to
be living out the consequences of irrational borrowing. Reckless financiers
merely watched others live out the consequences of their irrational financial
engineering. Accordingly, calls to examine executive compensation were
popular, if the end result would be some sort of negative effect on Wall
Street executives. However, to support this type of scrutiny, theories
emerged as to how and to what extent the compensation mechanisms
common at Wall Street financial firms caused the financial crisis.
A. The Systemic Risk Argument: Individual Compensation as Incentivizing
Risk-Taking
The individuals who worked and traded in this new financial arena took
inappropriate risks, perhaps because their compensation packages
encouraged them to do so or because they were merely playing with other
people's money. The term "moral hazard"'" was introduced to the general
public as a catchall phrase to describe the incentives of any person to take
on additional risks due to the fact that he is not fully responsible for the
potential downside consequences. Many have argued that aspects of the
financial crisis may have been caused by moral hazard wherein many
financial institutions, acting through thousands of employees, purchased or
sold complex financial products such as credit default swaps and other
derivatives that proved to be riskier to the parties involved than the price of
those products reflected ex ante. The actual employees who made the
decisions to purchase or sell these products may have made poor decisions
either because their financial models did not accurately assess the risk of
these products or because these employees were insulated from their own
poor judgment. According to the latter theory, employees are rewarded
through compensation for the volume of their financial trades or possibly
51 The most general definition of "moral hazard" refers to post-contractual
incentives of contract parties to act in ways that benefit themselves to the detriment
of the other. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR
LAWYERS 50 (2003) ("After a contract is made, a party to it may have incentives to
act in a way that's detrimental to the other party to the contract."); ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DISPUTES 13 (2000) ("In almost every deal in which the parties have a
continuing relationship there will be the potential for moral hazard. The moral
hazard problem concerns post-contractual opportunism."). In the context of the
financial crisis, the term's meaning is borrowed from the insurance literature,
whereby someone who is insulated from her losses loses the incentive to be careful.
See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 196 (2007) ("If
insureds possess complete coverage, the problem will be most serious, for they will
then have no reason to avoid losses .. ").
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according to the success of those trades, but they are not penalized for the
failure of those trades.
52
More importantly, employees are not rewarded for abstaining from
poor financial opportunities. Therefore, financial actors rationally choose
to enter into riskier trades or projects on behalf of their firms. 53 On an
individual scale, the risks of these actions are borne by the firm, reflecting
on the firm's management and affecting the firm's bottom line to the
detriment of shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. If firm
management believed that this incentive structure resulted, on balance, in
poor decision-making and fewer profits, then management would be in the
best position to supervise employees and redesign performance evaluation
systems. If lower profits continued, then shareholders might exit through
selling their shares and creditors might only extend credit on more stringent
terms. In other words, private markets for capital and credit would respond
to this "moral hazard" problem, which may be a subset of the "pay for
performance" problem.54
However, if these incentive mismatch problems are happening at
multiple financial firms, and the firms are interconnected, and the firms
then fail, then the economy as a whole may suffer. Should these financial
bad actors all make the same risky decisions in the same time frame, then
the external consequences of those choices will be felt not only by the
actors' firms but by the wider universe of market participants.55 Though the
chances that these actors at different firms making the same risky decisions
at the same time seems far-fetched or at least not capable of happening
repeatedly over time, the decision process described above actually makes
the universality of risky decisions more likely. If financial actors are
rewarded for successful projects and likely not penalized for poor decisions,
the likelihood of being penalized is probably diminished if the actor can
52 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 64 (quoting SEC
chairman Mary Schapiro as saying, "Many major financial institutions created
asymmetric compensation packages that paid employees enormous sums for short-
term success, even if these same decisions result in significant long-term losses or
failure for investors and taxpayers.").
53 See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L. REV. 183, 204-09 (2009) (describing in detail the skewed incentives of
an asset manager who is rewarded for profits, but terminated for either no profits or
losses).
54 Arguably, pay for performance critics are also concerned with executives who do
very little to enhance firm value, perhaps by taking no risks at all, whereas the
moral hazard and systemic risk concerns focus on employees who decrease firm
value by taking on excessive risk.
55 See Okamoto, supra note 53, at 185 ("In the years leading up to the Financial
Crisis, however, excessive risk taking became systemic as a series of interrelated
parties took risks that compounded the exposure of the others. One party's failure
led to the failure of another, which in turn led to more failures.").
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assure management that others in the industry were making the same
miscalculation. Furthermore, just as financial actors are not rewarded for
abstaining from riskier decisions, they may in fact be penalized for
abstaining from projects that ultimately prove successful, particularly if
others in the industry were choosing to enter into those opportunities.
Therefore, making similar decisions to others in the industry, even if risky
ones, is safer for the decisionmaker than going it alone. The end result will
then be that the probability of many financial firms facing setbacks in the
same areas at the same time is higher than might otherwise be estimated.56
The final phase of the moral hazard tale is that if the U.S. government
believes that financial firms should be provided assistance either industry-
wide or on an individual basis should the firms face catastrophe because of
poor decision-making, then even the firm does not bear the ultimate risk of
poor decisions. 57 Not only does the individual actor face moral hazard in
that she does not bear the consequences of miscalculating risk, but the
actor's firm does not either. Therefore, it may not even be in the firm's
interest to work in order to align the individual's incentives to create less
risk overall for the firm. The firm may benefit when risky decisions prove
fruitful, but may receive government assistance should the poor decisions
aggregate to threaten the firm's existence. Granted, firms may not wish to
pursue this course of action because painful losses will rarely equal
threatened insolvency that warrants government assistance. Managers will
bear the brunt of most losses and therefore incentivizing such risky
behavior will not be in their interest. However, if a coming economic crisis
56 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 419 (dissenting
members of Commission detailing ten essential causes of the meltdown, including
a "common shock" that caused unrelated financial institutions to fail because of
"similar failed bets on housing" and a "risk of contagion" due to particular firms'
failures "triggering balance-sheet losses in its counterparties").
57 The implied government support of U.S. financial institutions that are
systemically important has been given too much debate, often termed the "too big
to fail" problem. Even after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, which purports to
address the problem, Standard & Poor's announced in January 2011 that it factors
the probability of government support of banks into its credit ratings system. See
STANDARD & POOR'S, GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL: BANKS 48 (2011).
Faced with a financial crisis, a government will often, but not
always, provide additional support to protect confidence in its
economy, in the expectation that the cost of this additional
support is less damaging to the overall economy than allowing
banks to fail. We recognize that financial institutions, banks in
particular, fulfill the crucial functions of safeguarding national
savings, allocating savings and deposits to companies and
individuals in the form of loans and investments, and serving as
intermediaries and agents in financial transactions.
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is likely, a firm may face a moral hazard problem as insolvency becomes
more and more a possibility.
58
B. Individual Compensation as Undeserved Windfall
Compensation has become a flashpoint in debates concerning the
financial crisis because of the blame that has been heaped upon financial
firms and those in that industry. To hear about these financial participants'
salaries both before the crisis, during the crisis and afterward brings misery
to some, particularly those hit hard by the housing crisis, economic crisis or
both. Critics are especially harsh when the financial firm was a recipient of
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") funds, as described below.
However, the salaries of the financial participants are not logically tied to
an unrelated person's job loss or credit woes. By no stretch of the
imagination are these salaries zero-sum defeats for anyone else, even
taxpayers. However, knowledge of highly paid executives, particularly
when the companies they lead are not successful, leads to outrage from the
public at large.59
V. "PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE": THE PRE-2008 EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION DEBATE
The popular debate over executive compensation did not begin
following the 2008 crisis, but in fact may be traced to the post-1929 crash
era. 60 Moreover, in every Congressional session in recent memory,
58 The theory that firms take on more risk as they take on leverage, which may
benefit shareholders but increase losses for debtholders, is widely accepted. See
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 244 (Foundation Press 1986) (1995) (noting that stockholders have
capped downside but unlimited upside, which makes them more risk-seeking than
debtholders). This conflict is even more apparent "in the zone of insolvency." See
generally Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate
Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 824 (2008) (describing efforts
to extend fiduciary duties to bond creditors "in the zone of insolvency" to reduce
the impact of option theory). Recently, commentators have noted that option
theory gives managers even more incentive to take on risk when the firm is a
banking institution. See Frederick Tung, Bonding Bankers: Notes Toward a
Governance Approach to Risk Regulation, 4 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 465 (2009).
59 See David A. Katz, Populist Wish Lists Offer Legislative Parade of Horribles,
THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (July 28, 2009, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2009/07/28/populist-wish-lists-offer-legislative-parade-of-
horribles/#more-2824 ("Executive pay has long been a touchstone for debate and
an easy target for populist-minded reformers.").60 See Harwell Wells, "No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year": The Fight
Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 689 (2010).
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legislation has been proposed to curb executive compensation in some
way.6 ' Compensation paid to executives of a corporation, particularly a
publicly-held corporation, is generally a very small part of a corporation's
budget, yet these salaries are lightning rods for public criticism.
Additionally, if boards of directors paid executives less, the benefit per
employee or per shareholder of a publicly-held corporation would be
negligible.62 However, knowledge of highly paid executives, particularly
executives of unsuccessful companies, leads to outrage from the public at
large.6 3 More to the point, following the 2008 financial crisis, stories of
recent executive payouts and particularly payouts following the crisis
64
enraged lawmakers and taxpayers alike.65
Two related arguments have historically been employed in the debate
over regulating executive compensation. The first is that executives should
not receive pay packages that they did not earn through adding value to the
company. This argument is often referred to as the pay without
66performance argument, after the well-known book by the same name.The second argument is that executive compensation packages have
61 See, e.g., Executive Compensation Tax Reform Act of 2002, S.2722, 107th
Cong.; Jobs & Growth Tax Act of 2003, S.2, 108th Cong.; Executive Stock Option
Profit Recapture Act, H.R. 4208, 108th Cong. (2004); Protection Against Executive
Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005); Fairness &
Accountability in Reorganizations Act of 2006, H.R.5113, 109th Cong.; Income
Equity Act of 2007, H.R.3876, 110th Cong.; Corporate Executive Compensation
Accountability & Transparency Act, S.2866, 110th Cong. (2008) (in the current
111 th Congress, no fewer than forty unique pieces of legislation have been
introduced, including of course, the Dodd-Frank Act.)
62 But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005) (arguing that, in the
aggregate, curbing excessive managerial pay "would have a discernible effect on
corporate earnings" but arguing that more importantly, excessive compensation
distorts managerial incentives).
63 See Katz, supra note 59.
64 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Joy of Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A23
("The bottom line is that Goldman's blowout quarter is good news for Goldman
and the people who work there. It's good news for financial superstars in general,
whose paychecks are rapidly climbing back to precrisis levels. But it's bad news
for almost everyone else.").
65 Post-crisis compensation packages were particularly under suspicion. See, e.g.,
Chad Bray, Cuomo Seeks Data on Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2010, at A4
(reporting that New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo had contacted eight
financial firms that had received (and repaid) TARP funds, "seeking details on the
compensation paid by the banks for 2009, as well as information on how the
compensation and bonus plans were determined and the scope and magnitude of
lending by those firms.").66 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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become excessively large in the U.S., particularly when compared to the
wages of the average employee in the same company.67
A. Old Story #]: "Pay Without Performance"
Thip pay without performance argument is difficult to counter. Of
course, executives should have to earn their pay. No one would argue in
favor of undeserved salary or bonuses. 8  However, one can argue that
salary packages are negotiated between the executive and the company
representatives, and in many cases approved by the board of directors. The
executives are not solely paying themselves out of corporate funds at rates
of their own choosing. Therefore, if boards of directors choose to obligate
themselves to pay their executives at certain rates, then legislatures would
be replacing the judgment of the board with their own judgment. And, if
legislatures begin examining contracts after performance to judge whether
the contract price was good in hindsight, then this violates the purpose of
contracting altogether. This argument, referred to as the contractarian
approach, attempts to preserve contractual freedom for the contracting
parties.
Pay for performance proponents argue, however, that the parties are not
69
contracting in a perfect environment. Conflicts of interest, board capture,
and opportunistic compensation consultants combine resulting in less-than-
arms-length executive compensation contracts. Directors, who are
otherwise delegated the power to oversee the assets of the firm, may have
conflicts that prevent them from unbiased salary negotiations with
executive officers who may be fellow employees of inside directors and
may have social or industry ties with outside directors. In addition, even
67 Even Bubchuk and Fried's landmark book reminds us of the income gap at the
very outset of their discussion. See id. at 1 ("In 1991, the average large-company
CEO received approximately 140 times the pay of an average worker; in 2003, the
ratio was about 500:1.").
68 However, commentators have argued in favor of the undeserving giving back
salary or severance packages negotiated prior to poor performance, but paid after
poor performance. See Josh Fineman, Nardelli Exit Package Called "Outrage,"
May Heighten Pay Debate, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2007, 4:59 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aI7fAyAMAi2A&r
efer=home (quoting Nell Minow as saying "[Nardelli] should be giving money
back to the company, not taking anything more" in response to news that exiting
Home Depot CEO Robert Nardelli would receive a $210 million severance
package after his poor six years as chief executive).69 See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 313-18 (2009) (describing
the optimal contracting theory and two countervailing theories: market forces
theory, in which the market for CEO pay is thin and not robust; and managerial
power theory, wherein the board is captured).
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compensation committees, solely comprised of outside directors, may be
suspect. Outside directors are selected by the chief executive officer to be
nominated to the board, so true independence for arms-length contracting
may not exist.70  Third-party consulting firms who give executive
compensation advice may also inject an industry bias in increasing pay
packages that over time ratchet up the "market price" for executives.7'
Therefore, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that the end products
of these bounded negotiations are kept in check.
1. Pay Without Performance Reforms
Pay without performance regulation that focused on strict caps probably
would not fare very well,72 while other reforms focused on the ability of
shareholders to approve compensation packages ("say on pay"). If
shareholders are the owners of the corporation, then they must be entitled to
vote on how the assets of the corporation are spent, particularly in this
realm. 73 Because of the conflicts of interest and the potential of board
capture, the true owners, the shareholders, are the most objective arbiters of
just compensation. Therefore, shareholders should be given the ability to
70 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 66, at 82 (noting that other factors besides
independence may align directors with CEOs, including whether the CEO
appointed that director to the board).
71 See id. at 39 (describing how compensation consultants compile industry data to
justify higher salaries, arguing that good CEOs should be paid above market and
poor CEOs should be paid at market); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 62,
at 657-58 ("This widespread practice [of paying CEOs more than the industry
average] has led to an ever-increasing average and a continuous escalation of
executive pay.").
72 Even Professor Bebchuk has testified that at least for non-financial firms, "[t]he
government should not seek to limit the substantive arrangements from which
private decision makers may choose." Compensation Structure & Systemic Risk:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111 th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of
Lucian A. Bebchuk).
73 Shareholders have not been very successful, however, in litigating claims that
excessive pay packages to executives breach fiduciary duties that boards owe to
shareholders or constitute waste. See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The Supreme Court of Delaware determined that the
Board of Directors had not breached any fiduciary duties by either hiring Michael
Ovitz as President under the terms of his contract, or by terminating him without
cause after sixteen months, or by paying him the $130 million due to him under the
contract's termination provision. Id. In so holding, Justice Jacobs points out that
the day Ovitz's hiring was announced, Disney common stock rose 4.4%, or $1
billion. Id. at 40. In addition to the fact that the $130 million package seemed not
unreasonable due to the effect on share price, during the fiscal year 1996, Disney
reported revenues of $18.7 billion and costs and expenditures (of which salary is a
part) of $15.4 billion. See WALT DISNEY CORP., FACT BOOK 1996 (Consolidated
Statement of Income for fiscal year ended July 30, 1996).
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effectively monitor and discipline the compensation negotiation process
through an approval mechanism. Until this most recent crisis, however, say
on pay proposals in the United States were not successful.74 ' Whether
shareholders believe their managers to be overpaid or underpaid reflects an
intra-firm corporate governance problem, one that has rarely been the
subject of federal law.75
Second, some reforms focused on decreasing the incidence, of board
capture during executive salary negotiations. For example, the Securities
Exchange Commission amended Regulation S-K in 2006 to require much
more extensive disclosure by public companies of executive compensation
under Item 402.76 This disclosure would be included in registration
documents required by the Securities Act of 1933,77 and periodic reports
required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. T If companies were
forced to disclose compensation, then they would have incentives ex-ante to
pay reasonable, market-based salaries that could withstand shareholder
scrutiny.79 In addition, current shareholders and potential shareholders
could use compensation information to make informed decisions on
74 See, e.g., Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th
Cong. (2007) (requiring a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation
and "golden parachutes"); Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S.
1181, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama and
requiring nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation and "golden
parachutes"). The United Kingdom has had its version of a nonbinding say on pay
regulation since 2002. See Andrew C. W. Lund, Say on Pay's Bundling Problems,
99 KY. L.J. 119, 125-28 (2010-1l) (concluding that the experience in the U.K.
Frovides little evidence that say on pay disciplines firms).
But see Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization'" to "Mixed Governance" in
Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REv. 721 (2005).
76 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8765 (Dec.
22, 2006); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
55009 (Dec. 29, 2006).
77 See Form S-1, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933
(requiring under Item 11, Information with Respect to the Registrant, "(k)
Information required by Item 402 of Regulation S-K, executive compensation").
78 See Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (requiring under Item 11, Executive Compensation, "the
information required by Item 402 of Regulation S-K"). Form 8-K, which publicly-
held firms are required to file upon the happening of certain events, requires similar
compensation information to be disclosed upon either the hiring of a new executive
officer or an amendment to a compensation plan. See Form 8-K, Current Report
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or
Principal Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Principal Officers).
79 See Wells, supra note 60, at 757 ("There is better reason to think that the new
[ 1930s] disclosure requirements led firms to limit executive compensation as fear
of public outrage caused them to avoid the eye-popping pay packages of the
1920s.").
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whether to buy, sell or hold shares in the publicly held issuer. However,
this disclosure only applies to five individuals at any firm.80  The
compensation of other employees, whether in the millions or tens of
millions, need not be disclosed. Moreover, multi-million dollar
compensation of non-executives need not be disclosed.8' In addition, in
2002, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ amended their listing requirements
to mandate compensation committees comprising "independent directors"
that make recommendations to the full board of directors on CEO
compensation matters.8 2 Similarly, in order for incentive compensation to
be deductible under § 162(m), discussed below, the "outside directors" must
certify the compensation plan.8' These types of rules result in virtually all
publicly-held companies having no inside directors on compensation
committees. If board capture is truly interfering with arms-length
negotiations between executives and boards of directors, then independent
or outside directors should be less susceptible to board capture, at least in
theory.
2. Bonus Compensation
Complicating conversations about executive pay is the comparatively
recent but now firmly entrenched trend of including stock, stock
appreciation rights or stock options in executive pay packages. Originally
meant to align management's interests with those of shareholders, the value
of stock compensation should theoretically rise with the success of the firm,
80 See Regulation S-K, Item 402 (requiring disclosure for the "principal executive
officer," "principal financial officer" and "three most highly compensated
executive officers" other than the other two officers).
81 See Rosen, supra note 15, at 2918-19 (discussing the public comment process
surrounding the SEC's initial proposal to disclose additional, nonexecutive salaries
and the eventual rejection of that proposal).
82 NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05 (2004) (requiring the
compensation committee to be exclusively comprised of independent directors);
see also id. § 303A.02 (giving guidance on the definition of "independent").
NASDAQ Listing Rules 4000 Series, NASDAQ, INC. § IM 5605-6 (2009),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.con/NASDAQ/pdf/new listingrules.pdf.
Independent director oversight of executive officer compensation
helps assure that appropriate incentives are in place, consistent
with the board's responsibility to maximize shareholder value.
The rule is intended to provide flexibility for a Company to
choose an appropriate board structure and to reduce resource
burdens, while ensuring Independent Director control of
compensation decisions.
Id.
83 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii) (2006) (requiring that the compensation committee set
the performance goals at the outset of the compensation plan and then certify that
the goals were indeed met).
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as reflected in an increasing share price. On the flip side, should
management do a poor job of running the firm, the share price will
decrease, thereby decreasing management compensation. The stock
component of a pay package could vest immediately upon being earned or
it could be used as incentive compensation upon achievement of certain
benchmarks. Subsequent to the enactment of § 162(m), bonus
compensation came to constitute the overwhelming majority of an
executive's multi-million dollar compensation package.
One of the oldest arguments against stock-based compensation is a
theoretical one. Incentive compensation assumes that any value added by
an executive is reflected in an ever-increasing stock price and that all stock
price increases reflect that added value and nothing else.84 Realistically,
large stock price increases may be due to exogenous effects related to the
economy or the industry as a whole. 85 In fact, the stock price of a company
may increase, but at a rate lower than other competitors in an industry,
suggesting that management is doing a poor job, not a job worthy of
cashing in stock options. On the flipside, management may be
exceptionally skilled but operating during a period of economic decline.
Even putting theoretical qualms aside, stock compensation may create
more problems than it solves. The most obvious unintended consequence is
that incentive compensation can create incentives to commit accounting
fraud.86 Smaller reform measures have focused on penalizing strategic
"massaging" of public disclosures of information in order to hit share price
targets. For example, following the accounting scandals of the 2000-2001,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.87 Therefore, § 304 of
SOX required that bonus compensation paid to executives that was based
84 Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 309-11 (1995) (examining traditional
critiques of stock-based compensation, including the assumption that stock price is
an adequate proxy for executive performance).
85 Cf Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). The Court in Dura
Pharmaceutical stated in the context of loss causation that:
[A] lower price may reflect.., changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-
specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately
or together account for some or all of that lower price ... [o]ther
things being equal, the longer the time between purchase and
sale, the more likely that this is so ....
Id.
86 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 64 (reporting that
financial reporting abuses took place at Fannie Mae in the 1990s because "[t]ying
compensation to earnings also, in some cases, created the temptation to manipulate
the numbers.").
87 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, H.R. Res. 3763 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
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on share price be clawed back in the event of an accounting restatement.88
This forfeiture requirement applies only tor the chief executive officer and
the chief financial officer, however. Of course, accounting fraud is also
criminalized under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.89
In addition to encouraging numbers myopia, contingent compensation
based on a pubic company's stock price is fraught with other problems.
Bonus compensation may also incentivize riskier behavior than
shareholders would prefer. Incentive compensation may focus management
attention on short-term increases in a firm's stock price, sometimes to the
detriment of long-term appreciation and sometimes as a result of strategic
or even fraudulent measures. 90 As became fairly clear during the financial
crisis, individuals who are rewarded for upside but not penalized for
downside will focus resources on riskier and riskier projects.
Finally, executives could protect themselves against stock price decline
by purchasing complex financial derivatives to guarantee a return,
regardless of stock price movement.9' By purchasing an equity swap from
a financial intermediary, an executive could guarantee himself the income
from a diversified portfolio of stocks, therefore working around the implicit
limitations of stock-based compensation. 92 The variations and opportunities
to hedge the executive's equity position are numerous and widely available.
B. Old Story #2: Income Gap Disparity
The second argument employed to argue for compensation regulation is
the wide disparity in pay between the "rank and file" employee and
executives. This argument focuses on intra-firm differences but also cites
the nationwide income gaps between various household earners and the
8815 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
89 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
90 The FCIC Report repeatedly refers to bonus compensation systems as
contributing to short-termism at financial firms generally (p. 279); Bear Steams (p.
291); Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (p. 323); and Lehman Brothers (p. 343). See
generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 291.
[Bear Steam's exposure to risky mortgage assets, its reliance on
short-term funding and its high leverage] were a result of weak
corporate governance and risk management. Its executive and
employee compensation system was based largely on return on
equity, creating incentives to use excessive leverage and to focus
on short-term gains such as annual growth goals.
Id.
91 See Bank, supra note 84, at 321-23.
92 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 62, at 665 (reporting that empirical studies
suggest that executives are able to use inside information to make decisions on
when and whether to hedge stock-based compensation).
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highest-paid workers in the U.S. 9 3 Income disparity is a rallyi-ng cry for
politicians, 94 though economists are quick to emphasize that income
disparity is only part of an economic picture.95
For those concerned with the growing income gap, the only cure that
regulation offers seems to be a cap, which would seem outrageous to most
voters. The second best solution to prohibition, however, is taxation.96 In
addition, redistribution through taxation would seem to be particularly
useful in closing an income gap. Therefore, in 1993 the federal
government, as part of the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
eliminated the corporate tax deduction for certain executive salaries over $1
million. 9' From a liberty of contract standpoint, this softer regulation is
much less intrusive than a salary cap.98 Boards of directors are free to
contractually obligate themselves to pay whatever amounts they choose in
salary and bonuses, but companies will receive the benefit of the tax
deduction only for the first $1 million of salary. In addition, the increased
taxation of "excessive" salaries would theoretically result in a redistribution
of that salary to the taxpayer, satisfying income gap concerns. 99 However,
the non-deductibility of salaries applies only to a small number of
93 See Cait Murphy, Are the Rich Cleaning Up?, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 252
("America's lowest-paid workers make less, as a percentage of the median
wage.., than their counterparts in any other country.").
94 See Inequality in America: The Rich are the Big Gainers in America's New
Prosperity, EcoNoMIST, June 17, 2006, at 62 (stating that though Americans were
generally content to let the rich get richer and just dream of getting rich, rising
income disparity after 2000 eroded that optimism).
95 See Murphy, supra note 93, at 252 (suggesting that ameliorating the problems of
the bottom quartile is better policy than pillaging the top quartile to raise overall
economic health).
96 See Wells, supra note 60, at 750 (describing unsuccessful legislation in the 1930s
that aimed to punitively tax executive salary "in excess of reasonable
compensation" and remarking "[o]ne way to suppress an activity is to tax it").
Though several pieces of legislation were introduced to increase taxes on corporate
pay, in an era when income tax levels were quite high regardless, none then were
successful. See id. at 752 ("Congress was willing to identify high pay as a problem
and take steps to mitigate it, but proved unwilling to finally step in and identify
some pay as so high it should be taken away.").
9' I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2006) ("In the case of any publicly held corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee
remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of
such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds
$1,000,000").
98 In fact, existing contracts are unaffected. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(D).
99 Similar proposed legislation has been even more obvious, limiting deductibility
of salary to twenty-five times the lowest-paid full-time employee at a particular
firm. See Income Equity Act, H.R. 3876, 110th Cong. (2007).
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individuals, the same set to which SEC disclosure requirements apply.'00
Notably, § 162(m) limits only the deductibility of "nonperformance-based
compensation,"' 0 ' therefore encouraging large pay packages to attempt to
match pay with performance, therefore purporting to meet both goals of
compensation reform.102 Indeed, this reform had the intended consequence
of redirecting salary into bonus compensation, the favored tool of pay for
performance advocates.'0 3 As previously discussed, bonus compensation
may be the one type of compensation that most rewards excessive risk-
taking and so is counterproductive. In addition, this tax provision probably
did not result in substantially more redistributed income as few companies
pay straight compensation over $1 million.
This Article argues that the income disparity argument, though the most
straightforward, provides the least legitimate basis for regulation and
provides the most interference with the freedom of contract. Proponents of
the income disparity argument for rewriting contracts and redistribution
through taxation argue that even contractually-based earnings may be
windfalls and therefore subject to seizure.1 4
100 I.R.C. § 162(m)(3).
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'covered employee'
means any employee of the taxpayer if--(A) as of the close of
the taxable year, such employee is the chief executive officer of
the taxpayer or is an individual acting in such a capacity, or (B)
the total compensation of such employee for the taxable year is
required to be reported to shareholders under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by reason of such employee being among
the 4 highest compensated officers for the taxable year (other
than the chief executive officer).
Id.
'0' I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
102 See Bank, supra note 84, at 302 (noting that the exception for performance-
based compensation was an intentional attempt to encourage incentive-based
compensation over guaranteed salaries).
103 See Victor Fleischer, The Tax and Financial Engineering Angle,
CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/the_
taxangle.html (arguing that Michael Ovitz' enormous severance package, the
subject of an unsuccessful shareholder lawsuit, was the direct result of
management's attempts to structure a pay package with as little economic risk for
Ovitz as possible while also maintaining deductibility under I.R.C. §
162(m)(4)(C)).
104 See Hurt, supra note 48, at 358 (arguing that characterizing any portion of a
contractually bargained for return as "excess" leads to troubling operational
concerns based on the definition of "excess").
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VI. TARP RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In Fall 2008, the federal government instituted a program named TARP
in an attempt to bolster the troubled U.S. economy. 10 5 This program had
many aspects, but the most highlighted and controversial involved the U.S.
Treasury investing billions of dollars in troubled financial institutions.
Following this taxpayer "bailout," the public expressed outrage that
executives and other employees from those same institutions would
continue to receive large salaries and bonuses,'0 6 some pursuant to pre-
existing contracts. 107 At the time the TARP funds were disbursed, Treasury
restricted the deductibility of executive compensation to the first $500,000
in annual compensation, thus tightening the limitation in § 162(m).
However, salary and bonuses packages did not seem to decrease, at least
those packages that were reported in the media.
In response to this populist outrage, newly inaugurated President
Barack Obama urged Treasury to further restrict executive compensation
paid by companies that received "exceptional financial recovery assistance"
through the TARP program. President Obama criticized as "shameful" that
executives would be "living high on the hog" after receiving assistance.
10 8
The new Treasury regulations flatly prohibited salaries above $500,000.109
In addition, executive compensation plans would be subject to a say on pay
shareholder resolution and prohibiting the top twenty-five highest-paid
105 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
106 Legislators took this opportunity to publicly chastise such employees. E.g., H.R.
Con. Res. 76, 11 1th Cong. (2009) ("Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding
executive and employee bonuses paid by AIG and other companies assisted with
[TARP] funds" and requesting that President Obama ask AIG employees to either
forego such bonuses or repay the "hundreds of millions of dollars" AIG paid to
such employees.).
107 In one highly publicized case, Andrew J. Hall, a non-employee contractor
engaged in energy trading who earned Citigroup $2 billion in 2008 to 2009, was
owed a $100 million bonus under his contract with Citigroup. This contract
became a highlight of executive compensation reform for TARP recipients, even
though no executive compensation reform would ever include nonemployees and
even though Hall "performed" at a level commensurate with his "pay." See David
Segal, Trader's $100 Million Payday Poses Quandary for Regulator, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2009, at Al.
108 See Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives' Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2009, at Al.
'09 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Treasury
Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available
at http ://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/TreasuryAnnouncesNewRestrictio
nsOnExecutiveCompensation/ [hereinafter Treasury Restrictions].
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executives from receiving any golden parachute payments while any TARP
funds remain outstanding.'l 0
This compensation cap on TARP executives does not seem to fulfill the
pay for performance goal for compensation reform, though any salary cap
will reduce the "pay gap" at a particular firm."' However, a blunt salary
cap actually runs counter to calls to pay for performance. Paying all chief
executives $500,0001 12 seems to ignore any performance differentials at all.
Even if one believed that all chief executives of TARP companies were
poor managers not deserving of much compensation at all, the cap also
applied to newly hired chief executives. Therefore, if a firm fired the chief
executive whose poor performance threw the company into a tailspin that
required an influx of TARP capital, and then hired the best CEO candidate
in the country, the firm could only offer that candidate $500,000. l '3 This
limitation, in fact, could harm the firm, endangering the recovery of the
firm.
If TARP executive compensation reform does not serve traditional
compensation goals, then some other justification for this type of reform
must be made. Though this Article explores some of the systemic risk
justifications for post-crisis reforms below, the TARP salary cap does not
seem to meet that goal and was not touted as such. 1 4 The arguments for
11O Id.
1"1 Interestingly, this concept of capping salary at firms receiving government
assistance had been explored before. See Wells, supra note 60, at 752-53
(describing Congress' push to cap salaries at railroad firms receiving loans from
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a federal agency established in 1932). Though
salary caps were not instituted, the RFC was given the authority to deny loans to
companies paying excessive compensation. Id.
112 This argument assumes that no TARP firm paid their chief executive less than
$500,000, though several well-known CEOs have publicly refused to accept any
compensation, or compensation over $1, for symbolic purposes.
1"3 See Larry Ribstein, The stupid bailoutpay caps, IDEOBLOG (Feb. 4, 2009, 10:59
AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/02/the-stupid-bailout-pay-
caps.html ("Note that this proposal applies not just to the executives who messed
up, but to new hires that might lift the firms out of their morass. It, therefore, not
only doesn't focus on the bad, but helps free them from competition in the
executive talent market.").
114 Also in June 2009, the President appointed Kenneth Feinberg to review and
approve the compensation practices for executives at seven of the largest firms that
had received TARP funds. Theoretically, this review process included some
assessment of whether these compensation practices encouraged excessive risk-
taking. See David Cho, Zachary A. Goldfarb & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, U.S.
Targets Excessive Pay for Top Executives, WASH. POST, June 11, 2009, at Al. Not
coincidentally, at the same time that the restrictions were being implemented and
Feinberg was appointed, ten of the largest TARP recipients sought to repay their
TARP funds in full. See Robin Sidel & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Lets 10 Banks
Repay $68 Billion in Bailout Cash, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at A4 (noting that
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the TARP compensation cap then, range from the legitimate but' misguided
to the illegitimate and punitive.
One argument that has frequently been made to support the use of
executive compensation caps with respect to TARP recipients is that as a
large creditor, 5 the U.S. government has an interest in exerting financial
discipline on its borrower.' 6 Just as a lender may negotiate for certain
covenants and events of default relating to those covenants, the U.S.
government may also require that its borrower use its resources in certain
ways and not in others. Lenders frequently negotiate for various sorts of
covenants and negative covenants that restrain spending or otherwise
protect cash flow required for debt service: capital expenditure restrictions,
reserve account requirements, financial debt-to-equity ratios, prohibitions
or limits on additional borrowing, liens on assets, pledges not to grant liens
on assets, and requirements to maintain insurance. These are valid
demands of a lender, depending on the creditworthiness of the borrower,
and in keeping with the credit markets." 7 The willingness of a borrower to
accept these terms will have an effect on the borrower's cost of borrowing
(interest rate) or on the borrower's ability to borrow. However, limiting the
compensation of executives is not a common term found in most borrowing
documents, even for distressed companies."'
by repaying the government funds, these institutions avoid the Treasury
Restrictions on pay as well as the supervision of the pay czar, appointed the same
week the banks were allowed to repay their funds.).
115 The Treasury made its investment in the TARP recipients by purchasing
nonvoting preferred stock and warrants.
116 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 375 (stating the
goal of Treasury for TARP recipients to have ample cash both to repay Treasury
and to have money to make loans, so "[t]he enabling legislation did have provisions
affecting the compensation of senior executives and participating firms' ability to
pay dividends to shareholders.").
117 At this point, one must note that these borrowing covenants are bargained for by
the lender and borrower as part of the negotiation process. These terms are not
unilaterally imposed by the lender after the origination of a loan without
consideration for that amendment.
'8 To test the claim that limiting the compensation of executives is a reasonable
lending requirement and one that would serve the purpose of ensuring repayment,
this author examined publicly-available bond indentures of Fortune 500 companies
and of companies that eventually filed for bankruptcy. While analysis of that data
is ongoing, researchers have been unable to find a single covenant that specifically
restricted executive compensation.
At the same time, on October 1, 2008, Berkshire Hathaway purchased "10%
Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series G" from Goldman Sachs to provide much-
needed capital. The terms of the preferred stock enumerate certain voting rights and
preferences, but makes no mention of executive compensation. The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) at Ex. 3.1 (Sept. 28, 2008), available at
2011
52 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 6:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Frankly, the absence of such a term is not surprising, given the relative
size of the compensation of the chief executive or top five paid executives
as compared with expenses as a whole. In a large publicly-held firm, the
compensation of the top executive, including bonus compensation and stock
awards, constitutes a mere fraction of one percent of revenues." 9 If a
lender is concerned that a firm have sufficient cash on hand to pay debt
service, then restricting other outflows, such as capital expenditures, seems
logical. Alternatively, a lender might require that a borrower maintain a
particular ratio of earnings to debt or a particular level of earnings after
expenses. Logically, however, a lender would not focus on a small line-
item on a firm's balance sheet in order to preserve cash flow.
Therefore, from the statements made by the President, legislators and
the media about the restrictions, the most obvious justification, and the least
legitimate, for the TARP compensation restrictions is that the firms
deserved to be punished 20 after the fact for their presumed role in the
financial crisis.12 Because curbing executive compensation in this way
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/000095012308011720/000095012
3-08-011720-index.htm.
"9 In 2007, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein, was awarded total
compensation of approximately $70 million. A former partnership, Goldman Sachs
historically pays out over fifty percent of revenues in compensation. Though $70
million is an extremely large number, it is. 15% of Goldman's 2007 revenues of
$45.9 billion and .24% of its expenses. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/886982/000095012308000857/y46519el Ovk.htm ; The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/000119312508049485/
ddefl4a.htm. In other firms, CEO compensation is an even smaller piece of the
financial picture. At Citigroup, Charles Prince was awarded salary and bonus
compensation of $25.9 million in January 2007 for 2006 performance. This amount
represents .03% of Citigroup's 2007 revenues and .07% of its expenses. Citigroup
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312508036445/dl0k.htm: Citigroup Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312508055394/ddefl 4a.htm.
120 The financial firms were treated as if on probation for some presumed crime.
President Obama named Kenneth R. Feinberg as the pay czar to oversee
compensation packages at AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, General Motors,
Chrysler and the financing arms of two motor companies. See Labaton, supra note
108, at Al.
121 On January 14, 2010, President Obama announced details of a proposed
"financial crisis responsibility fee" of. 15% of liabilities of financial firms with at
least $50 billion in assets that received TARP or other federal crisis assistance,
whether or not that assistance had been repaid. See Press Release, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Proposes Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee to Recoup Every Last Penny for American Taxpayers (Jan. 14,
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serves no valid purpose, either to preserve cash flow or to align pay with
performance, then the pay caps are merely a response to public outcry.'22
Because "Wall Street" ruined our economy, "Wall Street" must somehow
feel the pain of the economic downturn. Unfortunately, one of the few
ways in which the federal government was able to affect financial firms was
in setting restrictions on those that accepted TARP assistance. 123  The
federal government used the rationale of accepting TARP assistance to
justify the compensation restriction, but the goal was retribution.
Retribution against high-paying finance executives seems to be a subset of
the second traditional argument against income disparity. If that argument
is persuasive as applied to all executives, then it has even more force
against executives who created negative externalities for our economy as a
whole.
VII. POST-2008 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM
A. New Story #1: Systemic Risk
Even if one believes that scandals and crises can spawn effective and
worthwhile regulation, the regulation must have a logical connection to the
behavior or activity that is suspected of causing the precipitating scandal.
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-
proposes-financial-crisis-responsibility-fee-recoup-every-last-penn. Though earlier
referred to by President Obama as a "risk tax," this tax or fee would have been
levied on thirty-five U.S. firms, and began to look like a punitive fine or spite tax.
In President Obama's statements, he made clear his purpose: "Instead of sending a
phalanx of lobbyists to fight this proposal or employing an army of lawyers and
accountants to help evade the fee, I suggest you might want to consider simply
meeting your responsibilities." Eric Dash, Wall St. Weighs a Constitutional
Challenge to a Proposed Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at Al. Subsequently,
Wall Street firms chose to lobby against the tax and even considered fighting such
a law as unconstitutional. Id. This proposal was not included in the final Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.122 See Editorial, Their Gamble, Everyone's Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at
A 14 ("Many Americans are understandably furious about the colossal bonuses
making a comeback at JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs while millions of
people around the world are still suffering because of Wall Street's recklessness.").
123 Many commentators have bemoaned the fact that the financial crisis did not
spawn a wave of criminal prosecutions of executives at Lehman Brothers, Goldman
Sachs and AIG. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, The Feds Stage a Sideshow, While the
Big Tent Sits Empty, DEALBOOK (Dec. 8, 2010, 3:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2010/12/08/where-are-the-financial-crisis-prosecutions ("The world was
almost brought low by the American banking system, and we are supposed to think
that no one did anything wrong?").
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Following the financial crisis, the catch-all culprit was "systemic risk.',
124
Alleviating systemic risk is a legitimate goal of regulation.
25
Commentators argued, then, that executive compensation led to systemic
risk; therefore, the regulation of executive compensation will alleviate
systemic risk.126 Perhaps there is a logical connection between excessive
risk-taking by individuals at individual financial firms and the financial
crisis. One can argue that copious amounts of interconnected risk increased
systemic risk to unacceptable levels, creating a cascade of losses that
touched almost all parts of the U.S. economy. In addition, firm-wide
compensation plans may increase intra-firm risk that may, when duplicated
at interconnected firms, increase systemic risk. However, there is no
proven connection between the compensation of executive officers,
particularly the top five executive officers at these firms, and excessive
risk-taking and the collapse of the U.S. economy. 1
27
Compensation reformers have struggled over the years in effecting
change based on a cry of pay with performance. However, whether
shareholders of publicly-held companies are overpaying executives based
on underperformance is fundamentally a private matter with private
remedies. SEC rules require boards of directors to reveal compensation
numbers to shareholders in disclosure documents; should shareholders
124 The Dodd-Frank Act creates a Financial Security Oversight Council that makes
determinations regarding the impact on systemic risk of particular institutions and
practices. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (stating as its
purpose "to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large,
interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that
could arise outside the financial services marketplace").
125 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 205-07 (arguing that regulation in this area is
justified both on an efficiency basis and as meeting public welfare goals).
126 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure:
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 257 (2010) (arguing that the outrageous compensation of the top five
executives at Bear Steams for the eight years prior to its collapse caused its failure
and the financial crisis it triggered).
127 Id. at 274-75.
That the firms' executives had incentives to take excessive risks,
it should be stressed, does not imply that their decisions were in
fact affected by such incentives ... Our analysis indicates that
the executives' payoffs provided them with excessive risk-taking
incentives, but it does not establish that these incentives in fact
had an impact on the executives' decisions. Yet even though our
analysis does not show these incentives in fact had an effect, it
does show that concerns that this might have happened should
not be dismissed-but rather taken seriously.
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believe the compensation to be high compared with share appreciation, then
shareholders are free to sell their shares quickly and instantly. Would-be
sellers purchase the shares with full knowledge of publicly-available
compensation plans and historical share price increases. Proposed
regulation to give shareholders ex ante consideration of these plans seems
of marginal value given that shares of a publicly-held company change
hands many times over the course of a year. 28 Given this fact, new
shareholders are constantly making an ex ante binding decision about
whether the disclosed compensation plan is acceptable to them.
However, compensation reformers were able to engage the public anew
following the 2008 crisis by dropping pay without performance arguments
and instead adopting the compelling, but fairly illogical, argument that
executive compensation schemes increased systemic risk. In addition,
reformers were able to play on the second traditional argument, the income
gap disparity, to buttress arguments for attempting to reduce the
compensation of executives at financial firms. Moreover, the income gap
between financial industry participants and the rest of the economy was
also used as a rallying cry for reform. 29 Therefore, recycled executive
compensation regulation marketed to alleviate systemic risk was successful.
Unfortunately, not only do the new executive compensation reforms have
little chance of affecting either intrafirm risk or systemic risk, but the
reforms distract away from identifying the true causes, even the true
compensation system causes of the 2008 financial crisis.
B. Dodd-Frank Act of2010
At the same time that the Treasury was announcing limitations on
executive salary for TARP recipients, the Treasury also foreshadowed
128 In fact, in recent years the average share of stock may change hands at least
twice in a year. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless
Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 11
(2010) (citing data that suggest that the annual turnover across all U.S. stock
exchanges in 2008 was over 300%).
129 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 61 (noting that
"[b]y 2007, financial sector compensation was more than 80% greater than in other
businesses .... "); Margaret Blair, Financial Innovation and the Distribution of
Wealth and Income 31 (Vand. U. L. Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 10-32, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract_
id=1656451 ("The acceleration in the growth of incomes in the financial sector
relative to the rest of the economy corresponds in timing to a dramatic widening of
the income distribution in the U.S. that also began in the 1980s.").
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future executive compensation reforms for all publicly-held companies.'
30
That same year, both congressional houses introduced legislation aimed at
reforming compensation at all publicly-held companies. The Excessive Pay
Shareholder Approval Act would have required a vote of sixty percent of
the shareholders of an issuer before that issuer could pay an employee more
than "an amount equal to 100 times the average compensation for services
performed by all employees of that issuer during such taxable year."'
' 3 1
This Act would satisfy concerns about the ever-increasing pay gap, though
intrafirm gaps may not be as pronounced as nationwide gaps. The
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act, passed by
the House of Representatives on July 31, 2009, would have required
independent compensation committees and nonbinding shareholder say on
pay. 132 This type of familiar reform serves pay for performance goals by
attempting to dampen board capture. The passage of this proposed
legislation may have also served parallel punitive goals as well as passage
of the bill occurred the day after media reports that nine firms receiving
TARP money paid out tens of billions in bonuses in 2008.1
33
These reforms would ultimately be combined into the Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010, now known as the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 134 This omnibus act,
filling over 800 pages as printed by the Government Printing Office, covers
topics as diverse as credit ratings agencies, securitization, consumer
financial products and executive compensation.
130 See Treasury Restrictions, supra note 109 (including a section entitled "Long-
Term Regulatory Reform: Compensation Strategies Aligned with Proper Risk
Management and Long-Term Value and Growth").
131 Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act, S. 1006, 11 1th Cong. § 2 (2009)
(enacted) (amending the Securities Exchange Act at § 16).
132 H.R. 3269, 111 th Cong. § 2(i)(1) (2009) (enacted) ("The shareholder vote shall
not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors and shall not be construed as
overruling a decision by such board, nor to create or imply any additional fiduciary
duty by such board .... ).
133 See Andrea Fuller, House Approves Limits on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2009, at Al ("The passage of the bill [on Friday] comes after news on Thursday
that companies receiving bailout money had paid bonuses of more than $1 million
each to thousands of their employees for 2008.").
114 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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1. Say on Pay I.
The pay without performance argument can support several of the
compensation reforms. 35 First, under § 951, shareholders in publicly-held
companies must receive information and be given the right to vote on
executive compensation at least once every three years in a separate
resolution. However, once every six years, shareholders have the right to
vote on whether this compensation vote should take place more frequently.
Similar to much of the proposed legislation that preceded Dodd-Frank, this
Act also makes the shareholder vote nonbinding. This type of requirement
could result in boards spending shareholder dollars to hire compensation
experts and legal experts to create these executive compensation packages
and disclose them in proxy materials, with little effect. Arguably,
nonbinding say on pay may have a deterrent effect. Any negative vote of
the shareholders will be appear in the media and be a negative public
relations incident for the board of directors and the executives. Therefore,
savvy boards will only propose compensation plans that shareholders will
approve.
Of course, all say on pay proposals assume that shareholders may in
fact not approve of current compensation practices. These practices are
disclosed to shareholders on an annual basis; any outrage over these salaries
by shareholders would then be reflected in large selling of shares.
136
Shareholders may, in fact, not be that sensitive to executive compensation
levels or practices, given the small amount that executive pay represents for
most firms. 13 7 In the years leading up to the financial crisis, publicly-held
companies routinely disclosed the compensation of executives, as required
by the Securities Exchange Act. This provision presumes that disclosure at
the end of a fiscal year is inadequate notice to the shareholders, leaving
them not enough time to "vote with their feet" and sell their shares.
Whether nonbinding ex ante disclosure every three years is more effective
remains to be seen.
Assuming that shareholder consent, even nonbinding consent, is
worthwhile, it cannot be so if shareholders do not receive sufficient
information with which to make an informed decision. In addition,
shareholders may not be able to make effective decisions over salary
numbers given without context. Therefore, under § 953, the Act directs the
SEC to promulgate rules requiring publicly-held corporations to not only
135 After the financial crisis, this argument has been reshaped into the "pay for
long-term performance argument," but that phrase is too bulky for use here. See
generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 16.
136 See Strine, supra note 128, at 7 (observing that "Stockholders of publicly traded
corporations have substantial liquidity and freedom to alienate their shares.
Indeed... they appear to love to alienate their shares.").
137 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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disclose the details of compensation plans, as previously required, but to
disclose every year to shareholders how executive pay is connected to
executive performance.1 38 This information would be in addition to other
information already required to be disclosed on an annual basis on Form
10-K.
2. Income Gap Disparity
Though the Excessive Compensation Act had proposed limiting
compensation based on the gap between the lowest-paid employees and
executives, Dodd-Frank requires only that publicly-held corporations make
certain disclosures of this intra-firm pay gap. Under § 953(b), this annual
disclosure must include (1) the median of all "total compensation" of all
employees except the CEO; 139 (2) the CEO's total compensation and (3) the
ratio of(l) to (2).140
Obviously, mere disclosure is a fairly weak tool to meet a goal of salary
flattening, but this section clearly stems from the income gap disparity
argument.' 4' In addition, intrafirm salary gaps may not correspond to
nationwide salary gaps. In fact, comparing intrafirm gaps among firms in
different industries may not be helpful or informative at all. For example,
the intrafirm gap at a service firm, which employs mainly professionals and
some administrative staff, may be much less than at a manufacturing firm,
which will have salaries ranging from one of the higher-paid CEOs to those
working for minimum wage.' 42  Finally, some commentators have
138 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
953 (requiring "a clear description of any compensation required to be
disclosed.., including information that shows the relationship between executive
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer, taking into
account any change in the value of the shares of stock and dividends of the issuer
and any distributions.").
139 As the disclosure requires the median of all salaries paid at publicly-held
corporations, omitting the salary of the CEO should not make an appreciable
difference.
140 Though this section seems straightforward, multinational companies sought
guidance on which non-U.S. employees to include, whether part-time employees
should be included, and what constitutes "total compensation." The SEC has not
issued rulemaking on Sections 953, 954 or 955 at the time of this writing, but has
announced that rules will be proposed by July 21, 2011.
141 See Jean Eaglesham & Francesco Guerrera, Pay Law Sparks 'Nightmare' on
Wall St., FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at 1 ("The law taps into public anger at the
increasing disparity between the faltering incomes of middle America and the
largely recession-proof multimillion-dollar remuneration of the typical corporate
chief.").
142 See Usha Rodrigues, Executive Comp: Too Much in the Sun?, CONGLOMERATE
(Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/executive-comp-too-
much-in-the-sun.
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suggested that this type of regulation would create incentives for firms to
outsource the lowest-wage position to narrow any intrafirm gap.
Whatever the costs of disclosing the pay gap between the CEO and the
median employee salaries, the benefits of this disclosure. . seem quite
minimal. Furthermore, the connection between an intra-pay gap and any
regulatory goal is not only unstated, but also unimaginable. Assuming that
a nationwide income gap is offensive to the public, then possibly some
regulatory steps could be taken to try to achieve distribution, perhaps
through the tax code. However, whether most Americans would choose
significant income distribution is unclear. To this point, there is no
connection between a nationwide income gap and an intrafirm gap. In fact,
at some of the most-hated financial firms, the median salary may be quite
high. Lastly, assuming intrafirm gaps are reflective of a nationwide income
gap, there is no connection between income disparity and any other
regulatory goal, such as reducing systemic risk. To say that the financial
crisis could have been averted had the median salaries at publicly-held
firms been higher or closer to the compensation of the CEO seems to have
little, if any, basis.
3. Clawback
Though SOX provided that in the event that a publicly-held corporation
restate its financials, CEOs and CFOs would have to reimburse the
company for any bonus or other incentive-based compensation (including
stock options) earned during a twelve month period after the erroneous
financial statements were certified, Dodd-Frank goes a bit further. The new
Act expands this clawback to any executive officer returning incentive-
based compensation received up to three years before the date of the
restatement. 43  However, this clawback is not an SEC enforcement
mechanism; the SEC is directed to require national exchanges to require
listed companies to include the clawback rule as a policy of each publicly-
held company's compensation structure. 44
A clawback mechanism could be an effective tool to tailor incentive-
based compensation to actual performance. Because of time lags,
employees may earn bonus compensation years before the results of their
performance can be adequately judged. However, this clawback provision
does not address this flaw in incentive compensation. The provision only
applies to CEOs and CFOs and only to accounting restatements. Therefore,
this clawback is merely a strengthening of the SOX provision, which was
141 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953.
144 Notably, several firms caught in the financial crisis had such clauses in their
compensation plans, but chose not to exercise them. See FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 198 (describing Citigroup's compensation
practices).
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aimed at reducing incentives to engage in accounting fraud, not at reducing
incentives to take on excessive, but otherwise legal, risk by various
employees throughout a firm.
4. Hedging Activities
One of the practical drawbacks of "pay for performance" incentive
compensation, which strives to pay executives only when the price of stock
options or other rights increases, is that executives can enter into hedging
arrangements to reduce their risk of nonpayment. 45 From a public relations
standpoint, the idea that market participants were betting against their own
companies or against the market as a whole during the financial crisis
seems repugnant to the general public. Section 955 of Dodd-Frank requires
companies to disclose whether employees and directors are permitted to
engage in hedging activities regarding company stock. This disclosure
requirement is interesting from a number of perspectives. First, it is not a
limitation, merely a trigger to disclose whether the employee or director is
permitted to hedge against incentive-based compensation. Therefore, if a
firm has a policy against hedging, then no disclosure is required to be
made. 146
In addition, the disclosure rule applies to any employee or outside
board member who receives incentive-based compensation. Therefore, any
employee who receives stock options under an employee stock option plan
would be included. If we are trying to align pay with performance, then
linking stock prices with every employee stretches this logic. Firms for
decades have issued stock options to all sorts of employees, some of whom
set policy and strategy and some of whom perform mundane job functions.
These types of option grants serve goals other than "pay for performance,"
such as a cheap way to increase employee salaries, a way to increase
employee morale by instilling a sense of ownership and company pride and
a way to retain employees who otherwise might make lateral moves.
Restricting an executive's ability to hedge downside risk from a large
incentive compensation package seems to be a more necessary goal than
restricting a mid-level employee from hedging against a retirement package
funded with company stock.
C. Excessive Risk-Taking at Financial Firms
Most of the Dodd-Frank solutions to the financial crisis recycle old
executive compensation solutions meant to solve other problems: pay
without performance and a growing income disparity. However, § 956 of
145 See supra Pt.V.
146 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 16, at 1951 (noting that Corporate Library
data do not reveal restrictions on CEO hedging at any of the firms in its dataset).
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Dodd-Frank specifically assumes that a new executive compensation
solution will protect financial firms and the U.S. economy that depends on
them. Under this section, the Act directs "appropriate federal -regulators'
147
to promulgate new rules for "covered financial institutions" 148 to disclose
their incentive-based compensation arrangements so that these same
regulators can determine whether compensation plans are "excessive" and
whether they "could lead to material financial loss." Notably, regulators
will be examining compensation arrangements for executives, employees,
directors and principal shareholders, not just the top five executives.
At the very least, § 956(b) attempts to leave behind the symbolic top
five executive compensation discussion and take aim at the compensation
plans that skew incentives of many employees in the aggregate.
149
Assuming that such a thing as inappropriate risk exists, and assuming that
certain types of compensation plans encourage that risk, the compensation
of the top five executives almost certainly does not directly encourage
inappropriate risks. The types of transactions, trades and activities of Wall
Street financial firms that are at the heart of the financial crisis were not the
handiwork of the CEO, CFO or other executives. These decisions were
made further down the corporate hierarchy, where traditional executive
compensation does not go. If there is a connection between incentive
compensation plans, firm risk and systemic risk, then the connection is
more in the middle of the corporate ladder. And, if there is a disconnect, it
lies in incentive compensation that rewards upside, but treats inaction and
downside as equal.
150
On March 30, 2011, as this Article went to press, the SEC, FDIC,
Treasury Department and other agencies issued a joint proposed rule under
147 These regulators are the FDIC, the Federal Reserve and the SEC, who have been
working together to promulgate new rules by April 2011.
148 The term "covered financial institutions" refers to the following entities with
assets of $1 billion or more: depository institutions, depository institution holding
companies, registered broker-dealers, credit unions, investment advisors, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, and any other institution that is deemed to be one by
regulators. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956(e)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
149 The FCIC Report focused on the annual compensation of many individuals, and
several were not "top five" executives. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMIssION, supra note 1, at 198 (listing the multi-million dollar compensation of
Citigroup employees who headed various divisions, but were not executive
officers). The report also points out that compensation plans skewed incentives of
"traders and managers." See id. at 62.
150 See Okamoto, supra note 53, at 206-07 (describing incentive compensation
based on performance as a call option, which will induce the holder to be more
risk-seeking than risk-averse).
2011
62 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 6:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
§ 956.'51 These rules require the entities that each agency regulates to
annually disclose to the agency certain narrative descriptions of its
compensation plans, without disclosing individual salaries, and explain why
the firm does not believe that these plans lead to excessive compensation or
material risk. Under the regulations, a plan may lead to excessive
compensation depending on the following factors:
An incentive-based compensation arrangement provides excessive
compensation when amounts paid are unreasonable or disproportionate to
the services performed by a covered person, taking into consideration:
(i) The combined value of all cash and non-cash benefits provided to
the covered person;
(ii) The compensation history of the covered person and other
individuals with comparable expertise at the covered financial institution;
(iii) The financial condition of the covered financial institution;
(iv) Comparable compensation practices at comparable covered
financial institutions, based upon such factors as asset size, geographic
location, and the complexity of the covered financial institution's
operations and assets;
(v) For postemployment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to
the covered financial institution;
(vi) Any connection between the individual and any fraudulent act or
omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to
the covered financial institution; and
(vii) Any other factors the Commission determines to be relevant.
Interestingly, during the financial crisis, one of the most striking revelations
was that financial institutions were doing the same things, but very badly,
and in the same way. So, to be able to justify a compensation plan on the
basis that other similar institutions have similar plans seems to hardly be a
way to reduce systemic risk or to police risky compensation schemes.
In order for a plan not to be deemed likely to lead to material financial
loss, the plan must be one that "(i) Balances risk and financial rewards, for
example by using deferral of payments, risk adjustment of awards, reduced
sensitivity to short-term performance, or longer performance periods; (ii) Is
compatible with effective controls and risk management; and (iii) Is
supported by strong corporate governance, including active and effective
oversight by the covered financial institution's board of directors or a
committee thereof."
151 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Agencies Seek Comment on
Proposed Rule on Incentive Compensation (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-77.htm.
Regulating Compensation
If compensation can be tied to excessive risk-taking, Which leads to
intra-firm risk, which can lead to systemic risk worthy of federal regulation,
then § 956(b) is the only aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act that can possibly
fashion that regulation. However, this section may be requiring the federal
government to perform an impossible task: to draft rules' prohibiting
compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks because they
are excessive or could lead to material loss. Unfortunately, the success of
such future rules depends on the definitions of "inappropriate risks,"
"excessive" compensation and "material" loss. At its core, §956(b) asks
federal regulators to determine for all future times, what risk is
inappropriate for a financial firm to take. These guidelines, or "standards,"
as they are termed are fairly broad and depend on determinations of
"effective controls and risk management" and "effective [board] oversight."
One unintended consequence of this provision may be to provide
shareholders with a way to successfully challenge board oversight through
the federal securities law where state law had previously not provided an
easy remedy.
Just as shareholders or their delegated managers may be in the best
position to determine whether their CEO's performance merits her pay,
shareholders or their delegated managers may be in the best position to
determine which risks are inappropriate risks for the firm to take, even if
that firm is systemically important. When they are wrong, they will incur
losses. If the individuals took these risks without permission or outside of
set parameters, then the individuals may be fired. However, sometimes
managers or shareholders will be wrong. Finns may condone individuals
for taking risks that seem appropriate, according to financial models or
intuition or both, and they may be wrong. 152 However, if we are convinced
that firms will consistently be wrong, that neither the individual, or
management or the shareholders can accurately identify which risks are
appropriate and which are not, then the federal government would not seem
to have any additional expertise with which to make such a decision.
15 3
Alternatively, firms could create systems whereby individuals face
intra-firm liability for risky projects gone bad. However, firms may believe
that such a system will encourage risk-aversion and lead to a sub-optimal
level of risk.
15 2 See Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas 0. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
159, 205 (2010) (arguing that it is unlikely that financial participants were
engaging in positions they knew to be losers; therefore, either at the outset the
positions were not losers or the participants were mistaken at the outset).
153 See id. at 160 ("Without defining when risk taking becomes excessive, schemes
to prevent executives from taking 'too much' risk remain fatally incoherent.
Because the science for such a determination does not exist, proponents of this
approach can only hope that government will get right what industry has failed to
achieve.").
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Perhaps we think that firms could easily make these assessments and
put controls in place but have no incentives to do so because risk is
externalized to shareholders or the taxpayer. Setting the level of acceptable
risk high is a win-win situation: if the risky decision proves fruitful, the
firm profits, but if not then neither the individual nor the firm or the
shareholders suffer. If this is the case, then perhaps regulation will fill a
void. But a firm can only depend (if ever) on government subsidy or even
the capped downside of a liquidation proceeding during the period when the
firm is almost insolvent. For most firms, the downside risk should be
enough of a consideration. Perhaps regulators will be like Goldilocks. The
SEC, Treasury or FDIC will tell us which risks are appropriate, and which
ones are not. However, Goldilocks never purported to be an expert on
porridge, or chair-making, or bed-making. She merely knew what she
liked. Section 956(b) will be a failure if the future rules merely codify the
types of risk that federal regulators, who are not participants in the industry,
can tolerate.
Finally, assuming that regulators know which types of risk are
inappropriate, regulators will have to be able to prune away the types of
compensation plans that encourage inappropriate risks. Section 956(b) does
not call on regulators to prohibit risk-taking, just the compensation that
encourages it. Regulating a judgment call on risk is tricky enough, but
regulating a judgment call on a judgment call seems to be almost
impossible.
If any type of compensation reform could decrease firm risk, and
therefore systemic risk, then it would be reform that cures an individual's
incentives to be more risk-seeking than risk-averse. However, this assumes
that managers and shareholders do not want their employees, particularly
financial traders, to be risk-seeking because they think it benefits
shareholders and other stakeholders. This may actually be a false
assumption as risk-taking is not only preferable at times; it is also
historically encouraged in corporate governance law. 54 To carve out what
is inappropriate and appropriate risk-taking seems a Herculean task, and
perhaps one best left to those directly bearing the risk. To prohibit certain
types of compensation schemes because of a perception that the scheme
may encourage inappropriate risk, usurps the shareholder's ability to choose
what level of risk-seeking is preferable for that firm under the untested
assumption that all firm risk exacerbates systemic risk.
"4 Limited liability for shareholders enables shareholders to prefer risk-seeking
boards of directors. More to the point, the doctrine of the business judgment rule
reflects a preference for directors to be risk-seeking and shareholders to be
perfectly diversified.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Crises lead to reform efforts. The torts crisis has led to statutory reform
in every state and at the federal level to curb the losses felt by certain repeat
players. The financial crisis may be seen as a contract crisis, which has led
legislators to attempt to reform the operation of contract law, both ex post
and ex ante. Generally, U.S. legislators have had little appetite for
interference with private contracting. However, the housing crisis seems to
reflect that various government actors have an appetite for such activity,
provided the benefits of the "new" contract inure to a sympathetic contract
party, to the detriment of an unsympathetic one. Executive compensation
reform provides one example of an arena with unsympathetic contract
parties that became an easy target of such contract reform. Though earlier
efforts failed, the new rhetoric of systemic risk has lent success to
compensation reform efforts. Under the guise of curbing excessive risk'and
its spillover effect into the financial system as a whole, Dodd-Frank Act
enacted previously introduced executive compensation proposals into law.
In addition, one particular provision will give regulators the fairly
unprecedented power to prohibit certain types of private compensation if
there is a theoretical connection with systemic risk.
This Article urges restraint by legislators to rewrite existing
compensation contracts and prohibit ex ante other types of compensation
contracts. Not only does the new executive compensation reform have little
likelihood of effecting stated goals of reducing systemic risk, but regulation
may have unintended consequences at financial firms. Finally, setting a
precedent for interference with private contracting seems unwise. New
targets of such legislative contract reform energy may be pensioners, union
employees and public employees whose contractual compensation suddenly
seems undeserving as well.
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